This paper examines the underlying structural and functional crises of the International Criminal Court (ICC) from the perspective of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and political realism. The Court was formed by the Rome Statute of 1998,[1] which gave it a global mandate to end impunity for the world’s worst atrocities, but its historical focus and institutional design have shown major persistent biases. This research critically evaluates the referral mechanism of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Article 13(b) by a qualitative legal-doctrinal and comparative case study approach. The analysis shows how the referral process operates as a political filter that shields non-member superpowers while brutally targeting weak countries in the Global South. The article addresses the textual tension between the Head-of-State immunity under Article 27 and the obligations of third parties under Article 98. It chronicles the arc of continental resistance, from African Union (AU) non-cooperation directives against former Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir[2] to the statutory disobedience established in the 2014 Malabo Protocol.[3] The article ends by examining current enforcement deadlocks involving Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to show how, whenever universal jurisdiction conflicts with the vital interests of powerful states, supranational criminal law is subordinated to Westphalian sovereignty and executive realism. The report concludes that we should not expect any major structural decoupling from geopolitical hierarchies and the ICC’s pursuit of global justice will remain a flawed and selective exercise.